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Embodied Education: 
A Convergence of Phenomenological 
Pedagogy and Embodiment
Denis Francesconi and Massimiliano Tarozzi
University of Trento
Abstract: In this article we argue for the necessity of a new double alliance be-
tween phenomenology and cognitive sciences (through embodied theory) on 
the one hand, and between phenomenological pedagogy and the embodiment 
paradigm on the other. We strongly believe that phenomenological pedagogy 
should enter into dialogue with the cognitive sciences movement called “Em-
bodiment” in order to renew its educational theories and practices. Indeed, the 
new suggestions about the mind that come from the embodiment paradigm 
can already have a huge impact on learning and education, but a relatively 
structured “pedagogy of consciousness” is still missing. ! is topic will be dis-
cussed with a special focus on body and embodied consciousness, which nicely 
brings together these di" erent traditions. Finally, an actual example of how the 
embodiment paradigm and phenomenological pedagogy can converge will be 
presented through the practice of meditative experience.
Keywords: Phenomenology, Pedagogy, Cognitive science, Embodiment, Mind-
fulness.
1. Introduction
Phenomenological pedagogy has had a long and important tradition with-
in the history of education and the social sciences in general. ! is tradition 
goes back especially to Merleau-Ponty and his works on psychology, pedago-
gy, and human development, and it has been later developed by many interna-
tional scholars related to the phenomenological educational movement, such 
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as, among others, Max Van Manen,1 in North America, and Piero Bertolini,2 
who has played a fundamental role in the dissemination of the phenomeno-
logical movement in Italy and who is the founder of the Italian tradition of 
phenomenological pedagogy.
However, in the last two decades, phenomenological educators seem not 
to have noticed, or to have paid much attention to, a further development 
within phenomenology: namely, the promising encounter of phenomenology 
and cognitive sciences, which has produced the so-called “Embodied ! eory” 
or “Embodied Cognition” approach, generally de# ned as “Embodiment.” 
As we will show in this paper, this epistemological and empirical movement 
has greatly increased within di" erent disciplines—psychology, philosophy of 
mind, anthropology, sociology, neuroscience, cognitive sciences—and today 
it appears to be one of the most promising and in$ uential approaches in edu-
cation as well. Some of the pillars of the embodiment paradigm that corre-
spond—in spite of the classical cognitivism—to key concepts in education are 
the role of subjective experience (# rst-person perspective), the body (embod-
ied cognition), the environment (embedded cognition), and the situation/
experience (situated cognition) in the constitution of the “life of the mind.”
! is crucial paradigm shift within cognitive and social sciences does not 
seem to be taken in consideration yet by phenomenological pedagogy as an 
opportunity to renew and extend educational theory and practice. ! is may 
be attributed to the fact that some phenomenological educators are not recep-
tive to interesting and stimulating changes and unexpected evolution in con-
temporary phenomenology. Our intent in this paper is (1) to provide a general 
and brief description of “Embodied Cognition” as it has evolved; (2) to discuss 
the problems of consciousness and of the phenomenological mind from the 
pedagogical point of view; and (3) to discuss the “educational question” about 
embodiment, the body-mind problem, and bodily consciousness. 
We aim to analyze how embodiment can relate to phenomenological 
pedagogy in a common e" ort toward a brand new approach to education, 
an education that, although close to and in permanent dialogue with cogni-
tive sciences, is more interested in the “learning consciousness” than in the 
“learning brain.” Indeed, in contrast to so-called “neuroeducation,”3 which is 
usually exclusively focused on brain-based curricula and teaching and the de-
velopment of functional skills, an “embodied education” aims to work on the 
self and the identity of people, that is, on the way in which people shape their 
1 M. Van Manen, Researching lived experience. Human science for an action sensitive pedagogy, 
Ontario: SUNY Press, 1990. 
2 P. Bertolini, Fenomenologia e pedagogia, Bologna: Malipiero, 1958; Id., L’esistere peda-
gogico. Ragioni e limiti di una pedagogia come scienza fenomenologicamente fondata, Firenze: La 
Nuova Italia, 1988; Pedagogia fenomenologica. Genesi, sviluppo, orizzonti, Firenze: La Nuova 
Italia, 2001.
3 K. W. Fischer, “Mind, Brain, and Education: Building a scienti# c groundwork for learn-
ing and teaching,” Mind, Brain, and Education, 3.1 (2009), pp. 2–15.
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presence in the Lebenswelt. Merleau-Ponty has demonstrated how the body 
plays a fundamental role in the constitution of cognition and self, thus laying 
the foundation for the current cognitive sciences. We think that current phe-
nomenological pedagogy should more fully take his legacy into consideration, 
building upon his e" ort to open phenomenology to a thoughtful encounter 
with pedagogy, developmental psychology, and “hard sciences” in order to 
face the challenge that cognitive sciences and neurosciences o" er to education 
and phenomenology today. ! e entire Embodied Cognition movement owes 
much to Merleau-Ponty, and nowadays, thanks to him, we can propose an 
original perspective about the mind and cognition, a perspective that has its 
focus on human experience and that can deeply in$ uence pedagogical theo-
ries and practices, giving them a new direction.4
Fin ally, an actual example of how the embodiment paradigm and phe-
nomenological pedagogy can converge will be presented. In particular, we will 
discuss how the body and bodily experience can be employed in educational 
settings through meditative experiences for the development of self-presence 
and awareness. 
2. ! e ! eoretical Framework: Phenomenology and Embodied ! eory
! e beginning was an encounter between two di" erent disciplines and 
schools of thought, as di" erent as chalk and cheese: phenomenology and the 
cognitive sciences. ! eir vast di" erence is probably the reason for this de# nitely 
successful encounter, which happened twenty years ago and is still increasing.
In particular, the area of so-called “Embodied Cognition” is at the inter-
section of di" erent # elds and di" erent theoretical traditions, namely, phe-
nomenology, cognitive sciences, and dynamic systems theory; interestingly, 
meditation has been the initiator and mediating # eld of this encounter.5 As is 
well known, in this area many di" erent disciplines have had a role and a func-
tion—to name a few, psychology, philosophy, computer science, and neuro-
science—but educational sciences have been excluded, whether intentionally 
or not. Except for a few authors and scholars,6 the role of education within 
cognitive sciences has been relegated to exploring mechanisms that underlie 
learning and cognition, rather than working to create a global, structured, and 
stable theory of education.7 And even less work has been done so far toward 
4 S. Gallagher and D. Francesconi, “Teaching Phenomenology to Qualitative Researchers, 
Cognitive Scientist, Phenomenologists,” in Indo-Paci" c Journal of Phenomenology, in press.
5 F. J. Varela, E. ! ompson and E. Rosch, ! e Embodied Mind. Cognitive Science and Hu-
man Experience, Cambridge (MA): MIT Press, 1991.
6 M. Dallari, I saperi e l’identità. Costruzione delle conoscenze e della conoscenza di sé. Milano: 
Guerini, 2000; F. Santoianni, Educabilità cognitiva, Firenze: Carrocci, 2006.
7 D. Ausubel, J. Noak, and H. Hanesian, Educational Psychology: A Cognitive View, New 
York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1978.
 266 Denis Francesconi and Massimiliano Tarozzi
a marriage that we think cannot be postponed any longer, the marriage be-
tween phenomenological pedagogy and the embodiment paradigm. Later in 
this article we will focus on this possible alliance, both from a theoretical and 
a practical side. Indeed, we will argue that today this alliance represents a new 
possible path not only for phenomenology in general, where embodied theory 
has been widely received in the dialogue between philosophy and cognitive 
science,8 but also for phenomenological pedagogy. 
So, where does this connection come from? And what is it based on? Accord-
ing to Gallagher and Zahavi, the best example to explain the close connection 
(closer than has been thought) between phenomenology and cognitive sciences 
is the “case” of Merleau-Ponty.9 It could seem a paradox, but nowadays Merleau-
Ponty—better known as a phenomenological philosopher—is often considered 
one of the co-founders of the cognitive sciences10 thanks to his outstanding 
work on perception, self, and body. Merleau-Ponty was not only one of the 
leaders of the phenomenological movement of his time—straddling the middle 
of the 20th century—but he was also extremely interested and quali# ed for psy-
chology, education, and the neuroscienti# c results of that time. Starting from 
these interests, he fully addressed the topic of the body within pedagogy and 
psychology. Reading, for example, Phenomenology of Perception, you immedi-
ately notice how his attitude always oscillates between philosophical discussion 
and scienti# c and experimental data from the knowledge available at his time, as 
is commonly done today in philosophy of mind and cognitive sciences. A good 
example, among others, is how he deeply investigated and discussed the issue 
of the phantom limb, a topic of considerable importance in modern cognitive 
neuroscience. ! e contemporary debate on the role of the body in the constitu-
tion of cognition, lived experience, and perception is a much heated debate in 
current cognitive science, but during the 20th century Merleau-Ponty was one 
of the few to develop a deep and structured analysis of these topics, and his work 
is still a cornerstone for many other scholars of our time. 
It is known that at the end of the last century, the work of Merleau-Ponty 
and other phenomenologists was e" ectively brought into the cognitive scienc-
es # eld mainly by one book, namely, ! e Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science 
and Human Experience, by Francisco Varela, Evan ! ompson, and Eleanor 
8 S. Gallagher and D. Zahavi, ! e Phenomenological Mind: An Introduction to Philosophy of 
Mind and Cognitive Science, London: Routledge, 2008; S. Gallagher and D. Schmicking (eds.), 
Handbook of Phenomenology and Cognitive Science, Dordrecht: Springer, 2009.
9 M. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, Engl, transl. by  C. Smith, London, 
Routledge, 2002. 
10 S. Gallagher and D. Zahavi, ! e Phenomenological Mind, op. cit.; Gallagher and Schmick-
ing, Handbook of Phenomenology and Cognitive Science, op. cit.; V. Gallese, “Corpo vivo, simulazi-
one incarnate e intersoggettività. Una prospettiva neuro-fenomenologica”, in M. Cappuccio (ed.), 
Neurofenomenologia. Le scienze della mente e la s" da dell’esperienza cosciente, Milano: Bruno Mon-
dadori, 2006, pp. 293–327; J. L. Petit, “La spazialità originaria del corpo proprio. Fenomenologia 
e neuroscienze,” in M. Cappuccio (ed.), Neurofenomenologia, op. cit., pp. 163–194.
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Rosch. ! at book marked a boundary between the old and new paradigm 
for the cognitive sciences, a boundary that nowadays is clearly visible. ! e 
main revolution caused by that book has been, as indicated, the connection 
between phenomenology, Eastern thought (especially Buddhism), and mod-
ern cognitive neuroscience, a connection devoted to creating a new way to 
think of the mind as an “embodied mind,” grounded in lived experience. 
Today, twenty years after the book’s release, the forerunner work of the early 
phenomenologists is also often considered to be of critical importance for its 
huge impact in educational experience with regard to many themes,11 includ-
ing consciousness, subjectivity and subjective experience, intersubjectivity, 
sociality and social cognition, intentionality, perception, body/embodiment, 
time, and research methodologies, with special regard to qualitative methods.
! e embodied approach, unlike the classic cognitivist approach that ini-
tially came from cybernetics and, later, from informatics and the computa-
tional approach, deeply re-evaluates the role that subjective experience plays 
in the construction and expression of cognition and knowledge; it accordingly 
recalibrates everything, even the research interests and methodologies useful 
to investigate the so-called embodied mind, the mind that is ontologically ex-
pressed by the connection with the body and the environment, the mind 
that has an ontological # rst-person dimension. ! is approach—which has a 
few ancestors in some works that appeared in the late 1970s by such scholars 
as Humberto Maturana, together with Varela12 and Hubert Dreyfus13—has 
grown considerably in recent years within the scienti# c literature, and has 
produced several currents of thought: embodied cognition or embodiment,14 
grounded cognition,15 radical embodiment,16 enactivism,17 situated and em-
bedded cognition,18 extended mind,19 naturalized phenomenology,20 and neu-
rophenomenology.21
11 E. ! ompson, Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology, and the Sciences of Mind, Harvard 
University Press, 2007, p. 20.
12 H. R. Maturana and F. J. Varela, Autopoiesis and Cognition. ! e Realization of the Living, 
Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1980.
13 H. Dreyfus, What Computers Can’t Do, Cambridge (MA): MIT Press, 1972.
14 F. Varela, E. ! ompson and E. Rosch, ! e Embodied Mind, op. cit.
15 D. Pecher, and R. A. Zwaan, Grounding Cognition: ! e Role of Perception and Action in 
Memory, Language, and ! inking, Cambridge (UK): Cambridge University Press, 2010.
16 A. Chemero, Radical Embodied Cognitive Science, Cambridge (MA): MIT Press, 2009.
17 J. Stuart, O. Gapenne, E. Di Paolo, Enaction: toward a new paradigm for cognitive science, 
Cambridge (MA): MIT Press, 2010.
18 S. Gallagher and D. Zahavi, ! e Phenomenological Mind, op. cit.
19 A. Clark, Supersizing the Mind: Embodiment, Action, and Cognitive Extension, New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2011.
20 J. Petitot, F. J. Varela, B. Pachoud, J. M. Roy, Naturalizing phenomenology: Issues in con-
temporary phenomenology and cognitive science, Stanford (CA): Stanford University Press, 1999.
21 A. Lutz, “Toward a neurophenomenology as an account of generative passages: A # rst 
empirical case study,” Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 1.2 (2002), pp. 133–167; 
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According to Gallagher and Zahavi, we can likely say that everything began 
with the so-called “hard problem”, that is the problem of the phenomenological 
mind.22 Cognitive scientists decided to face it, after years of avoiding it, when 
Varela and his colleagues clearly pointed out that a paradigm shift was necessary, 
and it would have been necessary to move from the behavioral and computa-
tional conception of the mind to an “ecological” one, a paradigm able to con-
sider the central question for the science of the mind, the question of “Who”, 
the problem of the subject and of the subjective perception of the world. ! e 
question was condensed in the term “experience”, which takes together the sub-
ject/object relationship in an ongoing, real, live modality, and which o" ers a 
completely di" erent perspective on the mind and the way to study it. 
Nowadays the embodied approach is a&  rmed—and even fashionable—
but still so much has to be done for a concrete paradigm shift, especially in 
the educational sciences, with regard to the role of the body and experience in 
the constitution of cognition and identity.
3. ! e Phenomenological and Embodied Mind
! ere is a recent growing interest in the body both from the philosophi-
cal and cognitive sciences approaches. Embodied, embedded, enacted mind 
are di" erent ways to de# ne a common thesis: following Merleau-Ponty’s in-
tuitions back in the 1950s, mental activity depends not only on the brain, 
but also on the body. However, the body has many dimensions: experien-
tial, psychological, functional, biological, intersubjective.23 Taken in its plural 
de# nition, the embodied mind notion avoids the old intractable problems 
inherent in the computationalist approaches of 20th century atomism and 
radical empiricism. On the contrary, according to Merleau-Ponty’s idea of 
embodiment, the body is both a lived experience structure and a context for 
cognitive mechanisms.
From the embodied perspective, following Merleau-Ponty, cognition is 
not considered as the result of a series of cerebral functions that somehow 
and somewhere interface with the body of the thinking subject. Instead, it 
has to be better seen as the result of the constant and structural interface ac-
tivity between the body and the environment, the result of the sensorimotor 
A. Lutz and E. ! ompson, “Neurophenomenology Integrating Subjective Experience and 
Brain Dynamics in the Neuroscience of Consciousness,” Journal of Consciousness Studies, 10.9–
10 (2003), pp. 31–52; J. F. Varela, “Neurophenomenology: a Methodological Remedy to the 
Hard Problem,” Journal of Consciousness Studies, 3.4 (1996), pp. 330–350.
22 S. Gallagher and D. Zahavi, ! e Phenomenological Mind, op. cit., pp. 107–108. R. Jack-
endo" , Consciousness and the Computational Mind, Boston: MIT Press, 1990; F. Varela, “Neu-
rophenomenology,” op. cit.
23 D. Legrand, T. Grünbaum, and J. Krueger (eds.), “Dimensions of Bodily Subjectivity,” 
special issue of Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 8.3 (2009), pp. 279–408.
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information that creates the background from which the mind can emerge 
and the horizon to which the mind can attend.24 ! e body constitutes cogni-
tion itself, it generates it, and it is its phylogenetic and ontological matrix. 
! e somatosensory and motor apparatus can no longer be considered as mere 
servants of the noblest neocortex, performers more or less diligent of skillful 
commands coming from the queen of higher cognitive functions; they rather 
seem to share the basic function of constructing the knowledge of reality that 
we constantly put in place (enact).25 Here there is the sense, not only ironic, 
therefore, of saying that the human being is “out of the head”:26 cognition—as 
well as meta-cognition, consciousness, self, mind, or any other name we want 
to give to self-presence—emerges both evolutionarily and biographically from 
the relationship of the mental and bodily aspects of human nature, creating, 
along with the environment, lived experience:27 therefore, embodied cognition 
indicates that the pure cognition that would be something like a view from no-
where28 does not exist (or we have not found it yet), because thought is always 
related to, and dependent upon, the whole subject and his/her entire biogra-
phy. ! e space-time dimensions literally shape the mind:29 thought does not 
merely relate to the body as an object of the outside world, but is made from 
it,30 it does not stem solely from interactions in the brain, which is a speci# c 
organ, but also from those in the person, that is, the organism. 
So, the problem of the mind recalls the question of consciousness, which 
is a topic at the core of phenomenology; indeed, it is possible to refer to phe-
nomenology as the science of consciousness. ! e etymology of the word “con-
sciousness” indicates self-awareness, or interior knowledge of what is going on 
inside me and to me at a speci# c moment in a speci# c place. And conscious-
ness is the origin and the core of the so-called “hard problem”; while this 
problem has to do with the essence of the phenomenological mind, Chalm-
ers31 characterized the neuroscienti# c analysis of cognitive functions (low or 
high level) such as language, memory, learning, motor control, sight, etc., as 
“easy problems” because they are clearly physiological events, not simple, but 
reducible to a range of a few variables bound to each other by a causal-e" ect 
logic and, thus, sooner or later explicable. In this case, the researchers create 
and face questions such as: which and where are the cerebral circuits assigned 
24 M. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, op. cit.
25 V. Gallese, Corpo vivo, simulazione incarnate e intersoggettività, op. cit., p. 302.
26 A. Noe, Out of Our Heads: Why You Are Not Your Brain, and Other Lessons from the Biology 
of Consciousness, New York: Straus and Giroux, 2010.
27 S. Gallagher, How the Body Shapes the Mind, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005.
28 T. Nagel, ! e View From Nowhere, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989.
29 S. Gallagher and D. Zahavi, ! e Phenomenological Mind, op. cit., pp. 69–85.
30 M. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of perception, op. cit.
31 D. Chalmers, “Facing up to the problem of consciousness,” Journal of Consciousness Stud-
ies, 2.3 (1995), pp. 200–219; Id., “Moving forward on the problem of consciousness,” Journal 
of Consicousness Studies, 4.1 (1997), pp. 3–46.
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to a speci# c cognitive function? Which speci# c cerebral areas get activated by 
a speci# c stimulus? 
! e “hard problem”32 emerges instead when we switch our interest from 
the analysis of operational functions of a physiological nature to the analysis 
of the phenomenological experience of these functions, which are of a sub-
jective nature, that is, the way in which a subject perceives him/herself in 
the Lebenswelt,33 in the real world, through his/her consciousness. Obviously 
consciousness can also be reduced to an easy problem, within the causal-ef-
fect paradigm, because consciousness too derives from a biological substrate 
(which is not the brain, but the brain-body-environment dynamic unit). In 
this case we speak of NCC (Neuronal Correlates of Consciousness).34 But at 
the same time consciousness has a subjective, qualitative, and more complex 
nature based on the fact that only the subject can experience it. In this case we 
speak of phenomenological mind, consciousness, or " rst-person perspective.35 I 
can communicate and share my interior states, but others do not have direct, 
immediate, and natural access to it. ! e “# rst-person” dimension of reality 
challenges the researcher36 and the practitioner to investigate the subject while 
perceiving and describing him/herself and his/her own cognitive activity.37 
In this case the research and practical questions are: what are the subjective 
dimensions of speaking, hearing, remembering, moving, seeing? How do sub-
jects perceive that? How do they describe that? 
! ese questions about the nature of the phenomenological mind lead to 
some pedagogical issues that are particularly interesting for educational psy-
chologists.38 Can we educate consciousness? Can we improve people’s ability 
to be aware, re# ning object perception and description? Can we speak of con-
sciousness as something that can learn to read reality? What understanding 
does the subject have of him/herself doing an action? ! at is to say, when can 
we speak about someone implicated in the perception of something? 
32 F. Varela, Neurophenomenology, op. cit, p. 331.
33 M. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of perception, op. cit.
34 E. ! ompson and F. J. Varela, “Radical embodiment: Neural dynamics and conscious-
ness,” Trends in Cognitive Science, 5.10 (2001), pp. 418-425.
35 S. Gallagher and D. Zahavi, ! e Phenomenological Mind, op. cit., p. 40.
36 W. M. Roth, “Cognitive Phenomenology: Marriage of Phenomenology and Cognitive 
Science,” in Forum Qualitative Sozialforschung / Forum: Qualitative Social Research, 5.3 (2004), 
Art. 12, http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0114-fqs0403129 ; D. Francesconi and M. Tarozzi, 
“Giving voice to the bodily experience. A phenomenological method in researching meditative 
experience”, unpublished paper presented at the International Human Science Research Confer-
ence, Seattle, 2010.
37 J. Shear, and F. J. Varela, “First-person Methodologies: Why, When and How,” Journal of 
Consciousness Studies, Vol. 6.2–3 (1999), pp. 1–14; Id., (eds), ! e View from Within: First-Person 
Approaches to the Study of Consciousness, London: Imprint Academic, 1999.
38 W.M. Roth, Cognitive Phenomenology, op. cit.
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4 Bodily Consciousness and the Pedagogical Question
4.1 ! e Learning Consciousness
According to some well-known theorists of mind, individual conscious-
ness is considered completely useless and not credible,39 something that even 
prevents action planning, control, and execution. From a phenomenological 
point of view, instead, consciousness is the core of the mind and life, because 
it gives the sense of what is going on and works as a meaning creator, with or 
without a role in the decision-making process. Any experience depends on at 
least minimal forms of self-consciousness that allow us to consider the experi-
ence as my experience, within the time-space $ ow of experience: 
Experience happens for the experiencing subject in an immediate way and 
as part of this immediacy, it is implicitly marked as my experience. For the 
phenomenologists, this immediate and # rst-personal givenness of experiential 
phenomena must be accounted for in terms of a “pre-re$ ective” self-conscious-
ness. By calling the type of self-consciousness in question “pre-re$ ective”, we 
wish to emphasize that it does not involve an additional second-order mental 
state that in some way is directed in an explicit manner towards the experience 
in question. Rather, the self-consciousness must be understood as an intrinsic 
feature of the primary experience. […] I can, of course, re$ ect on and attend 
to my experience, I can make it the theme or object of my attention, but prior 
to re$ ecting on it, I wasn’t “mind- or self-blind”. ! e experience was already 
present to me, it was already something for me, and in that sense it counts as 
being pre-re$ ectively conscious.40
Gallagher and Zahavi41 introduce the di" erence between pre-re$ ective self-
consciousness and re$ ective self-consciousness. ! e latter lies on the # rst as a 
bird, $ ying, lies on the air; you do not see the air, but it is right there, and it 
constitutes the background on which every movement can be done. Pre-re$ ec-
tive self-consciousness is then the background on which every consciousness 
of something can appear to the subject; even without any re$ ection on my 
own mental activity, being conscious of something is always being conscious of 
someone.42 ! e idea is that we are already into the experience prior to our own 
conscious awareness: “! e notion of pre-re$ ective self-consciousness is related 
39 T. Metzinger, Being No One: ! e Self-Model ! eory of Subjectivity, Cambridge: MIT 
Press, 2004.
40 S. Gallagher and D. Zahavi, ! e Phenomenological Mind, op. cit., p. 46.
41 S. Gallagher and D. Zahavi, “Phenomenological approaches to self-consciousness,” in 
E. N. Zalta (ed.), ! e Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring Edition), 2005; Id., ! e Phe-
nomenological Mind, op. cit.
42 S. Gallagher and D. Zahavi, “Phenomenological approaches to self-consciousness,” op. 
cit.; Id., ! e Phenomenological Mind, op. cit., p. 50. 
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to the idea that experiences have a subjective ‘feel’ to them, a certain (phenom-
enal) quality of ‘what it is like’ or what it ‘feels’ like to have them, without the 
need to re$ ect on it.”43 We are always already there, before we are able to concep-
tualize our conscious presence. Experience always has a certain way of manifest-
ing itself, and this certain way is certain for someone. In phenomenology, every 
experience requires a subject; there is a sort of self-referentiality, of for-me-ness.44 
So, every kind of experience is characterized by a form of mineness (Meinheit) 
that makes the experience one of meaning something for somebody.
! is is the # rst-personal givenness of phenomenal experience, and it can 
be split into two di" erent modalities: the weak and the strong " rst-person per-
spective. ! e # rst is related to having or embodying this perspective as the 
subjective manifestation of one’s own experiential life; the second has to do 
with the linguistic ability to refer and articulate the experience.45 We believe 
that the two modalities of the # rst-person perspective are closely related, es-
pecially from an educational point of view. Pre-re$ ective self-consciousness 
does not amount to # rst-person knowledge; it is a necessary but not su&  cient 
condition. We argue that the mineness, the subjective dimension of the phe-
nomenal experience, should be at the core of the educational processes. Both 
pre-re$ ective self-consciousness and self-re$ ective consciousness, even though 
in di" erent ways, can be the goal of a phenomenological educational practice 
aimed at the so-called “learning consciousness,” that is, the dynamic “I-ob-
ject” relationship, the “noesis-noema” couple, the ability to develop a certain 
way to stay in contact with reality, to perceive the world and make it mean-
ingful. Except for the pioneering approach of Piero Bertolini to “reconstruct” 
the worldview of young o" enders,46 pedagogical work on consciousness is 
far from being done in the schools or other educational contexts. And when 
it is practiced (not so broadly) it is usually reduced to as so-called “re$ ective 
thinking,”47 which is a valuable educational practice to educate the subjective 
dimension, but the re$ ective dimension does not exhaust the theme of con-
sciousness in education. However, it seems to us that the ability of the subject 
to develop the subjective dimension of perception, to create meaning about 
his/her experience, and to be phenomenologically a" ected by reality have to 
be further investigated by educational theory or inquiry.48 According to Husserl, 
43 Ibid., p. 49.
44 Ibid., p. 50.
45 Ibid., p. 47.
46 P. Bertolini, Per una pedagogia del ragazzo di#  cile, Bologna: Malipiero, 1965; P. Bertolini 
and L. Caronia, Ragazzi di#  cili. Pedagogia interpretativa e linee di intervento, Firenze: La Nuova 
Italia, 1993.
47 D. Demetrio, L’educazione interiore. Introduzione alla pedagogia introspettiva, Firenze: La 
Nuova Italia, 2000; L. Mortari, Aver cura della vita della mente, Milano: La Nuova Italia, 2002, 
pp. 146-153.
48 M. Tarozzi and L. Mortari (eds.), Phenomenology and Human Science Research Today, 
Bucharest: Zeta Books, 2010.
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the transcendental reduction, which attempts to reach consciousness in the 
most authentic sense, is an educational journey in itself, even if it can never 
be completely ful# lled.49
Education for “becoming aware,” meant to “educate” consciousness, is a 
practice not (usually) done at school, but we noticed that the proposal made 
by informal schools and courses attracts more and more adults, as if educa-
tional settings for the development of awareness were deeply intriguing for 
adult people. In particular, meditation practice seems to # t the request to 
deepen the ability of being self-aware and to develop the intentionality of our 
consciousness, since this ability is closely related to the conduct, interpreta-
tion, and comprehension of ordinary, normal everyday life. What people learn 
during meditative courses, for instance, is nothing miraculous, but something 
very concrete and pragmatic, that is, the way to stay in the Lebenswelt; people 
usually learn to look at the world in a di" erent way, to perceive di" erently, to 
improve their intentional skills, changing their gaze, and so switching from 
experience to lived experience, where the subject is fully present and can better 
appreciate what is going on. Indeed, a trained mind realizes that being pres-
ent to the world and to itself means being present to the present moment, with 
great awareness of the temporal dimension of the life of the mind. ! is does 
not imply the necessity of avoiding the metacognitive or narrative attitude;50 
on the contrary, metacognition is a strategic cognitive activity necessary to 
recollect the events in a meaningful order, taking a break from the current 
direct connection to the material world and re-creating the sense it makes 
for experience.51 What we mean is that metacognition cannot substitute for 
awareness, but awareness must be considered as its necessary support. We 
mean that it is necessary to be aware, present, and mindful in everything one 
is doing, saying, thinking, or re$ ecting: being there, where we are.
! e way in which the mind reacts to the world, with all its speci# c stimuli, 
is not only a fact of perception, but also a fact of how perception and reception 
are developed. All kinds of bodily—and mental—experiences and the ways in 
which subjects learn to control themselves and their minds are very interesting 
topics for the cognitive and educational sciences. It is a learning process that 
needs to be studied, both from phenomenological and educational perspectives. 
Being aware, as well as other cognitive functions such as writing, reading, 
speaking, calculating, and so on, can be learned and can be improved. ! is is 
what we mean when it comes to learning consciousness. Learning consciousness 
is the consciousness that learns to be in contact with reality, that is, to be able 
to stay in the $ ow of experience without losing the ability to understand what 
49 P. Bertolini, L’esistere pedagogico, op. cit., pp. 58–60.
50 M. Tarozzi, “Il paradigma dell’agire narrativo nel buddhismo mahayana,” Quaderni di 
Adultità, 3 (2002), pp. 49–61.
51 M. Dallari, La dimensione estetica della paideia. Fenomenologia, arte, narratività, Trento, 
Erickson, pp. 191–201.
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is happening there on a broader level. ! is is an attitude that can be improved 
through the phenomenological method and through speci# c bodily experi-
ences, for instance, as said, meditation. 
Following ! ompson’s suggestion about the division between static and 
genetic phenomenology, we consider genetic phenomenology from a peda-
gogical point of view52 de# nitely as the best option, if compared to static phe-
nomenology, for describing and expressing the learning consciousness, that 
is, the possibility of developing, changing, and improving the way in which 
consciousness tends toward the object. Indeed, 
static phenomenology analyzes the formal structures of consciousness, where-
by consciousness is able to constitute (disclose or bring to awareness) its object. 
Static phenomenology takes these intentional structures and their correlative 
objects as given and analyzer them statically or synchronically. Genetic phe-
nomenology is concerned with how these intentional structures and objects 
emerge through time; there, it cannot take them as given. Instead, it analyzed 
how certain types of experience motivate later and more complex types—for 
example, how implicit and prere$ ective experiences motivate attentive and 
re$ ective experiences. From the perspective of genetic phenomenology, experi-
ence has a sedimented structure, and the process of sedimentation needs to be 
understood in relation to the lived body and time-consciousness.53
4.2. Bodily Consciousness
According to a well-established phenomenological tradition that considers 
that subjects do not have a body but are a body, the embodied approach makes 
clear that in the mind-body relationship, the body not only precedes the mind 
for stimuli reaction, but is also active in the interpretation and comprehension 
of reality.54 ! at is why and how we can better talk about the fact that we do 
a body and we have/create a kinaesthetic consciousness.55 In fact, we must speak 
of the discovery of the sensorimotor and somatosensitive systems, given that in 
the past, the sensitive system and the motor system were considered as sepa-
rate; now, however, we know better that perception and action are so strictly 
coupled that we have to speak of the birth of the sensorimotor paradigm.56 ! e 
ability to understand reality, including the social world, seems to have a prag-
matic and prelinguistic nature more than a semantic one.57 So, if conscious-
ness is the awareness of what is happening in a given place in a given moment, 
52 E. ! ompson, Mind in Life, op. cit., p. 29.
53 Ibid., p. 30.
54 V. Gallese, Corpo vivo, op. cit.
55 E. A. Behnke, “Ghost Gestures: Phenomenological Investigations of Bodily Micromove-
ments and ! eir Intercorporeal Implications,” Human Studies, 20.2 (1997), p. 198.
56 V. Gallese, Corpo vivo, op. cit., pp. 307–308.
57 Ibid., pp. 313–314.
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what are we precisely aware of? ! e # rst object of our perception is our body; 
the body is what consciousness most fundamentally takes into account.58 Even 
when we do not deliberately pay attention to kinetic sensations—and that hap-
pens most of the time—the sensorimotor system creates what Damasio call the 
proto-self,59 which is comparable with what we said before about pre-re$ ective 
self-consciousness. ! e body gives us the awareness of being the person we are, 
the same person of the day before, in a certain environment in a certain mo-
ment. ! e body creates the “I-self continuum” that allows us to have the sense 
of mineness without thinking or re$ ecting, to be aware of ourselves without any 
iconic or linguistic representation. Paraphrasing Heidegger, who used to say that 
the language is the house of being, from an embodied perspective we should 
now say that the body is the house of being. 
! e recent discovery of the so-called mirror-neuron system has clari# ed how 
the body fully contributes to the understanding of actions executed by oth-
ers, and even of their meanings; the mirror system works both when a person 
acts and when he/she sees someone else acting.60 ! e most important result 
here seems to be the fact that we are—evolutionary—predisposed to recognize 
what another person is doing. ! e same can be said about objects: seeing an 
object means to evoke automatically what we will or may do with that object, 
it means to be already ready for a potential action, already tuned in with the 
surroundings, both material and social. In this way, the world becomes a lived 
world where the body is always the # rst translator from reality to meaning. 
Indeed, objects, persons, and situations are not only identi# ed, di" erentiated, 
and categorized through their physical appearances, but also with regard to 
their potential interaction with an agent.61 So, the role of the body appears to 
be to clarify and translate the interaction with the external world, where the 
most important element here is neither the external world nor the body, but 
the relationship between them. Within the dynamic process called action—or 
potential action—the agent can # nd his/her own way to act only through 
a bodily alphabet already constituted by the body itself, an alphabet that is 
pre-conceptual and pre-linguistic and that relies on the lived experience of 
the body. ! is bodily alphabet is also the basis for further experiences and the 
ground for bodily consciousness. To take control of our body and to be aware 
of it requires learning how our body shapes not only the mind, but also our 
social interaction and life. Being aware of the bodily dimension of our identity 
and of the bodily dimension of our interaction with the world means to be 
able to recognize, appreciate, and control, when necessary, the emotions, sen-
sations, and meanings that emerge from them: phenomenologically speaking, 
58 J. L. Petit, La spazialità originaria del corpo proprio, op. cit.
59 A. R. Damasio, ! e Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of Con-
sciousness, 2000, Houghton Mi'  in Harcourt, p. 285.
60 V. Gallese, Corpo vivo, op. cit., pp. 300–305.
61 Ibid., p. 301.
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a bodily consciousness is that consciousness that knows how to give signi# -
cance to a pre-linguistic I-world interaction through the empathic attitude.62 
Perceiving others means perceiving me-in-the-act-of-perceiving-others, not in 
a mentalistic e" ort, but through the body we are and the actions we do. ! is 
is the # rst step for empathy, that is, perceiving others as we perceive ourselves, 
feeling others as we feel ourselves, not because of a confusion about my and 
his/her identity, but because the body—and the experiences I have already 
lived—helps me to recognize what the other person is living; so, empathy, de-
rives from the lived body (Leib) rather than from the physical body (Körper), 
and the higher level of the lived body necessarily involves the consciousness 
not only of what is going on in a speci# c action, but also, and primarily, its 
meaning: “[…] in empathy we experience the other directly as a person, as an 
intentional being whose bodily gestures and actions are expressive of his or her 
experiences or states of mind.”63
5. Phenomenological Pedagogy and the Body
5.1. ! e Phenomenological Concept  of Learning
Looking more deeply at the phenomenological analysis of bodily con-
sciousness, we # nd important theoretical and philosophical references64 to 
Husserl’s work and, especially, to the work of Merleau-Ponty, whose distinc-
tion between Körper (the body as object) and Leib (the lived body) is a sort of 
cornerstone.65 ! is general distinction leads to a theoretical distinction with 
interesting repercussions in educational practice, a distinction between the 
body as an instrument, a machine that can be used in functional and in-
strumental ways in sports, performance, and communication, and the lived 
body as the expression of the individual’s identity. For example, in educational 
practice there is a di" erence between motor skills education and physical edu-
cation on the one hand and body education on the other,66 where the former 
62 Ibid., p. 317.
63 S. Gallagher and D. Zahavi, ! e Phenomenological Mind, op. cit., p. 183.
64 See M. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, op. cit., part I, ch. 4, but cf. also 
Husserl’s distinction between physical body (Körper) and subject-body (Leib), the lived and 
intentional body in the 5th Cartesian Meditation. See E. Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, Eng-
lish trans. by D. Cairns, ! e Hague: Martinus Nijho" , 1960. See also V. Iori, Nei sentieri 
dell’esistere: Spazio, tempo, corpo nei processi formativi, Trento: Erickson, 2006; U. Galimberti, Il 
corpo. Antropologia, psicoanalisi, fenomenologia, Milano: Feltrinelli, 2002.
65 S. Gallagher, How the Body Shapes the Mind, op. cit.; Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of 
Perception, op. cit.
66 P. Calidoni, A. Cunti, L. De Anna, P. De Mennato, I. Gamelli and M. Tarozzi, Pedago-
gia ed educazione motoria, Milano: Guerini, 2002; R. Farnè (ed.), Sport e formazione, Milano: 
Guerini Associati, 2008.
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are more attentive to the development of motor skills and applicative goals 
(Körper) while the latter points directly to the development of body identity 
(Leib). 
Following Husserl, Piero Bertolini argues that the body is the primary place 
for the “passive genesis” of subjectivity. Becoming a person requires young peo-
ple—Bertolini refers particularly to adolescents—to deal with some constraints, 
and the body is the # rst of them: it circumscribes the boundaries of our world-
view, it is the gate to intersubjectivity, and adolescents are constantly in balance 
between living the body and representing it. Educators can support these stu-
dents in becoming aware of the constraints of their body and overcoming these 
constraints by integrating them into a more stable body image.67
! e lived body is strictly connected to the way in which the subject can op-
erate in the world through practical knowledge and habits, which are $ exible 
and situationally attuned tendencies toward actions that are performed with-
out explicit thoughts and deliberate re$ ection prior to action. It is through 
our habits that we usually interact with the world, and habits are what our 
body has learned from the interaction of experience with the world.68
Øyvind Standal69 has pointed out that Hubert Dreyfus70 de# nitively pre-
fers the notions of ‘skill’ and ‘skillful coping’ rather than ‘habit’, since the 
concept of habit derives from behaviorism; according to Dreyfus, the con-
notation of habit is a “rigid behavior,” that is, exactly what Merleau-Ponty 
distinguished from the $ exible and situation-sensitive skills that constitute 
his concept of habitude. “L’habitude”is the word originally used in the French 
text of Phenomenology of Perception, which has been translated as “habit” in 
the English edition. But Dreyfus indicates that the notion of “habit” is so 
infused with unwanted connotations that its use destroys the intended mean-
ing of l’habitude. However, both Merleau-Ponty and Dreyfus use “habits” and 
“skills” to denote a $ exible, situational, and adjustable ability to act in the 
Lebenswelt through the lived body or Leib.71
As already mentioned, educational practice, especially from a phenom-
enological point of view, does not change and a" ect only the body as object 
(Körper), but also the way to live the body and to be a body (Leib). Mer-
leau-Ponty was interested in the notion of habit for the same reasons that he 
was interested in behavior and movement: they are phenomena that cannot 
be properly understood either by intellectualism or by empiricism. Indeed, 
67 P. Bertolini and L. Caronia, Ragazzi di#  cili. Pedagogia interpretativa e linee di intervento, 
Firenze: La Nuova Italia, 1993, pp. 45-46.
68 M. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, op. cit., p. 151.
69 Ø.F. Standal, Relations of Meaning. A Phenomenologically Oriented Case Study of Learning 
Bodies in a Rehabilitation Context, Unpublished PhD-dissertation, Norwegian School of Sport 
Sciences, Oslo, Norway, 2009, p. 54.
70 H. Dreyfus, “Intelligence Without Representation: Merleau-Ponty’s Critique of Mental 
Representation,” Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 1.4 (2002), pp. 367–383.
71 Ø.F. Standal, Relations of meaning, op. cit. 
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for Merleau-Ponty, as reported in Standal,72 “Habit has its abode neither in 
thought nor in the objective body, but in the body as mediator of the world.” 
A good example of this would be people who are skillful at typewriting.73 
According to Merleau-Ponty, such people do not have a formal knowledge 
of the place of each letter among all the others on the keyboard, nor do they 
respond to a conditioned re$ ex for each one; rather, “[habit] is knowledge in 
the hands, which is forthcoming only when bodily e" ort is made, and cannot 
be formulated in detachment from that e" ort.”
! us, for Merleau-Ponty, habit is a form of “knowing how” rather than 
“knowing that”. It is embodied knowledge; hence it is referred to as knowledge 
in the hands. ! e body involved in these habits is for Merleau-Ponty the “third 
term,” the alternative to the intellectualists’ and empiricists’ account of the 
body. It is a body that does not # nd its place in objective space. ! e spatiality 
of the body-in-action is the spatiality of a situation rather than a spatiality of 
a position.
! e e" ect that the phenomenological link between body and conscious-
ness has on education and learning is well explained by Herbert Dreyfus:74 
What one has learned appears in the way the world shows up; it is not repre-
sented in the mind and added on to the present experience. ! at is, according 
to Merleau-Ponty, what the learner acquires through experience is not repre-
sented in the mind at all but is presented to the learner as a more and more 
# nely discriminated situation, which then solicits a more and more re# ned 
response. In so far as the situation does not clearly solicit a single response or 
the response does not produce a satisfactory result, the learner is led to further 
re# ne his discriminations.
! us, following the suggestions that come from embodied theory, the object 
of education has to be an experience, a lived experience, and the body, a lived 
body. ! is reminds us the perspective of the abovementioned scholar Piero 
Bertolini, a student of Enzo Paci. He was one of the leading # gures of the 
phenomenological movement in human science in Italy, who at the end of 
the 1950s made his # rst attempt to apply a phenomenological approach to 
education, in 1958, with the book Phenomenology and Education.75 Bertolini 
combined his philosophical conversation with Paci with practical experience: 
in the same period he was the director of the biggest reformatory in Europe, 
in Milan, for ten years. ! is extraordinarily rich and strong experience, as well 
as phenomenological thinking, was the basis of an original perspective on 
phenomenological pedagogy as a rigorous science.
72 Ibid., p. 167.
73 Ibid., p. 166.
74 H. Dreyfus, “Intelligence Without Representation,” op. cit., p. 373. 
75 P. Bertolini, Fenomenologia e pedagogia, op. cit.
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For Bertolini, the ultimate scope of education is to support subjects in 
enlarging their worldview by operating on the intentional competence of their 
consciousness. In education, the ability to make sense of the world is more 
important than objective reality, and subjects need support in constructing 
their own worldview. Educators lead children toward the conquest of their 
intentional consciousness by making them aware of their active role in the 
construction of their worldview.76 In this sense the most vivid and modern 
side of a phenomenological approach in education consists in the improve-
ment of the ability to perceive—as Merleau-Ponty refers to perception—by 
not taking the world for granted, but being invited and supported to learn in 
order to understand and authentically see the world.
! e lifeworld (Lebenswelt), and not the presumed objective correlate of 
a given phenomenal reality, is the reality taken into consideration by educa-
tion as a phenomenological science. Education is not intended to discover the 
cosmic order behind educational phenomena, but is based on the intentional 
capacity of the subject who lives in the world and therefore on such a subject’s 
capacity to make sense of things, coming in that way to an authentic under-
standing not of res but of cogitata.
As we have indicated, the in$ uence of theories related to the embodiment 
paradigm on education theory is still weak worldwide, but it is de# nitely 
growing.77 Here below we present an example of how phenomenological edu-
cation can # nd its proper application in the real practical work. 
5.2 Meditation: Learning to be Aware
! e deep exploration of consciousness (vinaija) is at the very center of 
Buddhist thinking and practice. While according to di" erent traditions there 
are eight or nine levels of consciousness,78 within the Zen tradition it is com-
mon to say that consciousness will always be one degree above comprehensi-
bility. ! is concept is close to the one that we have already mentioned con-
cerning the di" erence between pre-re$ ective self-consciousness and re$ ective 
76 Ibid., L’esistere pedagogico, op. cit., pp. 182-183.
77 R. Barnacle, “Gut Instinct: ! e Body and Learning,” Educational Philosophy and ! eory, 
41.1 (2009), pp. 22–33; G. Dall’Alba, “Phenomenology and Education,” Educational Philoso-
phy and ! eory, 41.1 (2009), pp. 7–9.
78 ! e # rst # ve consciousnesses correspond to the # ve senses of sight, hearing, smell, taste, 
and touch. ! e sixth consciousness integrates the perceptions of the # ve senses into coherent 
images and is responsible for making judgments about the external world. ! e seventh con-
sciousness corresponds to the inner spiritual world; it is the seat of abstract thinking as well 
as of individual identity and the attachment of the self. ! e eighth is called the “store-house 
consciousness”; it is the place where individual and collective karma are stored, and here the 
seven prior consciousnesses are rooted. Some mahayana schools also refer to a ninth conscious-
ness, amala, which lies beyond karma, and which is the pure basis of life, a sort of enlightened 
condition of buddhahood. 
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self-consciousness. ! ere is an unreachable level of being aware that consists 
in the fact that there is a gap between being conscious and describing and 
comprehending the states of consciousness. However, one who works within 
the educational # eld knows that the real problem does not concern the level 
of consciousness of a subject, his/her ability to be aware; this is just the # rst step 
that an educator has to take when facing this question. ! e relevant problem is 
related to the conditions for developing this awareness, that is, the pedagogical 
conditions that allow the subject to make a step from one level of competence 
to another. ! is is development,79 and this is what “becoming aware” means; it 
is not “being” aware but “becoming” aware that is really pedagogical.
How is it that mindfulness/awareness can be developed? What we suggest, 
bringing back the teachings of great masters, is that mindfulness/awareness 
can be considered a skill, a competence among others, like reading, writing, 
and other activities, and that its development has to be treated in the same way 
as the others. Mindfulness can be strengthened through a speci# c training80 
just as a muscle can be trained to perform harder and longer work without 
getting tired easily. Moreover, awareness is considered part of the basic nature 
of the mind, one that has been temporarily obscured by habitual patterns of 
delusion but can be developed, just like every natural potential that human 
beings have. “As all these habits are cut through and one learns an attitude of 
letting go, the mind’s natural characteristic of knowing itself and re$ ecting its 
own experience can shine forth. ! is is the beginning of wisdom or maturity 
(prajna).”81
So, the development of awareness is a fundamental pedagogical theme, 
and it is the main goal of meditation as well: that is why we can speak of medi-
tation as education or, better, meditation as an embodied educational practice 
where the role of the body is crucial for self-development. Moreover, phe-
nomenology seems a very appropriate approach for studying the embodied 
mind through meditation, both because it # ts the topic of consciousness as a 
meeting point between body and mind better than other philosophical and 
cognitive traditions, and because it o" er useful methodological insights.
What we have to learn when we do meditation is nothing else than be-
ing able to use our awareness to deepen our presence in the world—not in 
a mentalistic way, but like a lived presence that has its cornerstone in the 
body and in the bodily dimension of life. It is embodied presence—embodied 
79 K. W.Fischer, “Mind Brain and Education,” op. cit., pp. 10-11; K. W. Fischer and T. R. 
Bidell, “Dynamic Development of Action, ! ought, and Emotion,” in R. M. Lerner (ed.), 
Handbook of Child Psychology. Vol. 1: ! eoretical models of human development, New York: Wi-
ley, 2006, pp. 313–399. 
80 N. Depraz, “Mettere al lavoro il metodo fenomenologico nei protocolli sperimentali. 
Passaggi generative tra l’empirico e il trascendentale,” in M. Cappuccio (ed.), Neurofenomeno-
logia, op. cit., pp. 249–269; N. Depraz, F. J. Varela and P. Vermersch, On Becoming Aware: A 
Pragmatics of Experiencing, Philadelphia: John Benjamins B.V., 2003.
81 F. Varela, E. ! ompson and E. Rosch, ! e Embodied Mind, op. cit., p. 96.
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mind—that is improved by meditation; it is a sort of cognitive-bodily posture 
that had to be educated, a new perspective on the world grounded in lived 
experience and in the body. In the preface to Phenomenology of Perception, 
Merleau-Ponty states that 
[t]he whole universe of science is built upon the world as directly experienced, 
and if we want to subject science itself to rigorous scrutiny and arrive at a pre-
cise assessment of its meaning and scope, we must begin by reawakening the 
basic experience of the world of which science is a second-order expression.82
Phenomenology makes a distinction between two di" erent attitudes, the 
natural and the phenomenological.83 In our everyday dealing with the world, 
we accept without question that there is an objective reality that we and other 
people are part of, and that this reality exists independently of us. ! is tacit, 
realistic belief—without which our ordinary dealings with the world would 
be disrupted by an endless set of questions—is called the natural attitude. Ac-
cording to Husserl, science also subscribes to the natural attitude, because it 
too takes for granted the existence of a world that is thought to be indepen-
dent of mind, experience, and theory.84
Phenomenologists, on the other hand, should be “aroused by and immedi-
ately sensitive to the completely enigmatic character of what for sound com-
mon sense, is without question and self explanatory.”85 Unlike the natural at-
titude, the phenomenological attitude involves questioning the unquestioned 
assumptions of the natural attitude, i.e., it makes us see the enigmatic in the 
self-explanatory. ! e question then becomes how this attitude can be taken up. 
Meditation, as well as phenomenology, is a technique for opening the eye to a 
new possibility of rebuilding our worldview, of seeing the world in its own way 
of appearing to us, and this can be done by educating our bodily consciousness. 
! e # rst step should be the discovery of the wandering/disconnected mind: 
Eventually, it begins to dawn on the meditators that there is an actual di" er-
ence between being present and not being present. In daily life they also begin 
to have instants of waking up to the realization that they are not present and of 
$ ashing back for a moment to be present—not to the breath, in this case, but 
to whatever is going on. ! us the # rst great discovery of mindfulness medita-
tion tends to be not some encompassing insight into the nature of mind but 
the piercing realization of just how disconnected humans normally are from 
their very experience.86
82 M. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, London, Routledge, 2002, p. 9.
83 D. Zahavi, Subjectivity and Selfhood. Investigating the First-Person Perspective, Cambridge, 
London: MIT, 2005.
84 S. Gallagher and D. Zahavi, ! e Phenomenological Mind, op. cit., p. 25..
85 Heidegger as quoted in ibid., p. 22.
86 F. Varela, E. ! ompson and E. Rosch, ! e embodied mind, op. cit., p. 25.
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! is is the proper meaning of mindfulness meditation, a meaning that # ts 
very well with phenomenology—that is, to develop global awareness through 
bodily awareness, and to develop awareness not only about ordinary objects or 
reality in general, but also about one’s own mind, one’s own cognitive posture.
! e life of the mind is a $ owing life, it is fresh, pure and clean water that 
$ ows underground: we do not hear it but we do feel it, we do not see it but we 
know it is there. ! e interiority is not seen, it is experienced. And awareness is 
nothing more than paying attention and giving voice to the life of the mind in 
its complex and dynamic relationship with the body, avoiding the abstract at-
titude so common in our ordinary life. As Varela and his colleagues remark,87 
[f ]rom the point of view of mindfulness/awareness meditation, humans are not 
trapped forever in the abstract attitude. ! e dissociation of mind from body, of 
awareness from experience, is the result of habit, and these habits can be broken. 
As the meditator again and again interrupts the $ ow of discursive thought and 
returns to be present with his breath or daily activity, there is a gradual taming 
of the mind’s restlessness. One begins to be able to see the restlessness as such 
and to become patient with it, rather than becoming automatically lost in it. 
Eventually meditators report periods of a more panoramic perspective. ! is is 
called awareness.
! rough meditation, expert meditators seem to reach a cognitive maturity, 
which re$ ects the ability to calm the mind, to live a state of rest and control 
of the $ ow of consciousness, whereas the beginning meditators are still prey 
to a random and chaotic $ ow of consciousness.88 ! e crucial point of this 
cognitive maturity seems to be the fact that it is not just cognitive, but rather 
embodied: it is a maturity that derives from a skillful and wise attitude toward 
the body-mind question. Our argument in this paper is that the main goal 
of any phenomenological pedagogy cannot be a mentalistic, logical, formal 
or propositional learning, but an embodied education or learning that closes 
the gap between body and mind and reduces the “disconnected mind” and 
the natural attitude toward reality.89 ! is is the great value that meditation 
can bring to a phenomenological pedagogical theory: meditation is an em-
bodied educational practice (not the only one) that aims to reconsider both 
87 Ibid., pp. 25–26.
88 D. Francesconi, ! e Embodied Mind: Mindfulness Meditation as Experiential Learning 
in Adult Education, 2010, Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Trento. http://eprints-phd.
biblio.unitn.it/403/. In this thesis is presented a qualitative study about the e" ects of medita-
tion on self-perception that has been conducted in Boston at the Harvard Graduate School of 
Education by Denis Francesconi under the supervision of Prof. Massimiliano Tarozzi.
89 D. Francesconi, “Embodied mind between education and cognitive sciences: Bodily con-
sciousness and meditation training,” International Journal of Interdisciplinary Social Sciences, 
4.10 (2009), pp. 19–28; Id., ! e embodied mind, op. cit.; Id., “Implicit and Explicit Learning 
in Motor Cognition. Issues for movement education,” ! e International Journal of Sport and 
Society, 2.1 (2011), pp. 1–8.
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the body-mind problem and the hard problem90 from a more pragmatic and 
experiential point of view, and that tries to develop a practical knowledge and 
a grounded cognition where the role of the body is not merely supportive, but 
crucial. Indeed, focusing on the body allow us to develop the ability to per-
ceive and recognize the $ ow of consciousness, to keep the mind focused on its 
own movement within ongoing experience, a sort of control of the dynamic 
nature of the mind without reducing the dynamism. Phenomenology focuses 
on consciousness, self, and perception, and meditation seems to be (one of ) 
the best experiences we can o" er from an educational point of view, not just 
to develop motor or bodily skills, nor just to develop cognitive skills; rather, it 
addresses a whole and integrated identity, a practical knowledge and maturity, 
an embodied mind. As Varela and his colleagues suggest,91
[i]t is important to realize that such maturity does not mean assuming the ab-
stract attitude. As Buddhist teachers often point out, knowledge, in the sense 
of prajña, is not knowledge about anything. ! ere is no abstract knower of an 
experience that is separate from the experience itself. Buddhist teachers often 
talk of becoming one with one’s experience.
6. Some Pedagogical Conclusions
In this article we have presented the pedagogical point of view about em-
bodiment, and we have done that by connecting phenomenological pedagogy 
with the current philosophy of mind and cognitive sciences. An Embodied 
Education, that is thhe encounter of phenomenological pedagogy and Em-
bodied Cognition, can play an important role within educational sciences, 
both in the theoretical and practical dimensions, going beyond the traditional 
position that connects phenomenology and pedagogy only along an existen-
tial perspective.92 Indeed, it seems to us that even though not so much work 
has been done yet to connect education and Embodied Cognition, such a 
connection has great potential. In particular, pedagogical attention should be 
focused on the so-called “# rst-person perspective” and on bodily conscious-
ness, as the meditative educational experience has shown.
We strongly believe in a pedagogical proposal for a phenomenologically 
oriented “learning consciousness.” ! is means we should undertake the e" ort 
to teach the perception/action couple, thereby developing a higher awareness 
90 F. Varela, Neurophenomenology, op. cit., p. 346.
91 F. Varela, E. ! ompson and E. Rosch, ! e embodied mind, op. cit., p. 26.
92 M. Van Manen, “Phenomenological Pedagogy,” Curriculum Inquiry, 12.3 (1982), 
pp. 283–299; Id., Researching Lived Experience, op. cit.; M. J. Langeveld, Einführung in die 
Pädagogik, 1963, Stuttgart: Klett; V. Iori, Nei sentieri dell’esistere: Spazio, tempo, corpo nei processi 
formativi, Trento: Erickson, 2006.
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of the dynamic relationship that we entertain with the Lebenswelt. Educating 
from a phenomenological perspective means to create an experiential pragmat-
ics where the person tries again and again to search out his/her own categories 
for understanding reality, builds and tests the structure of his/her conscious-
ness, re# nes his/her own description of the world, and develops the # rst-per-
son perspective.93 ! e phenomenological educator helps the subject to exer-
cise him/herself to watch and to better describe lived experience with the aim 
of improving the ability of the person to create a sustainable and meaningful 
presence in the world, a better life-of-the-mind.
Meditation, as already stressed by meditation teachers and masters and by 
many scholars—including the founders of Embodied Cognition, Francisco 
Varela, Evan ! ompson, and Natalie Depraz—can be one of the # elds of 
experience to connect the body and the mind, to learn mindfulness, the abil-
ity to stay in the $ ow of experience with awareness, presence, discrimination, 
and discernment. Indeed, meditation has an intrinsically pedagogical nature 
because it aims to develop and improve certain skills that in this case, unlike 
formal education programs such school, are more grounded in and related 
to human experience.94 Meditation is one practice, among others, that can 
de# nitely be considered a # eld for experiential learning, particularly for adults 
and in lifelong learning education programs, a way of learning from the prac-
tice about the self, a tool for building a subjective pragmatic of life. ! is must 
be the goal of any education as such, and it de# nitely is the goal of a phenom-
enologically oriented embodied education. 
Denis Francesconi
Massimiliano Tarozzi




93 N. Depraz, “Mettere al lavoro il metodo fenomenologico nei protocolli sperimentali,” 
op. cit.
94 D. Francesconi, “Embodied Mind Between Education and Cognitive Sciences,” op. cit., 
pp. 24-25; Id., “Pedagogia e neuroscienze cognitive in dialogo. L’esempio dell’esperienza corpo-
rea,” in Formazione & Insegnamento, 1 (2011), pp. 223–230; M. Tarozzi, Il paradigma dell’agire 
narrativo nel buddhismo mahayana, op. cit., p. 6.
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